This article examines how political parties affect checks and balances in Indonesia's presidential system through parliamentary factions, recall mechanisms, coalition politics, and the House of Representatives (DPR) channel for proposing Constitutional Court justices. It employs normative or doctrinal legal research using statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. The findings show that party influence is constitutionally mediated rather than an independent form of state power. Strong party discipline can create tension with the representative autonomy of legislators, while broad governing coalitions may reduce the political incentive for critical parliamentary oversight. Recent Constitutional Court decisions continue to accept recall by political parties as constitutionally permissible. The more appropriate reform is therefore to strengthen procedures, written reasons, review mechanisms, and safeguards for legitimate parliamentary activity rather than to remove the party's role. In Constitutional Court appointments, the DPR's authority to propose candidates should remain intact, but the process should be transparent, participatory, objective, and accountable. Political finance reform should also distinguish BPK audits of APBN/APBD assistance from broader disclosure and independent audits of private party funding. The article proposes a framework that strengthens party accountability while respecting the constitutional allocation of authority.