This article examines the consistency of Indonesia’s presidential system within a multiparty setting after the Constitutional Court changed its long-standing position on the presidential nomination threshold. Earlier decisions generally treated the threshold in Article 222 of Law No. 7 of 2017 as part of the legislature’s open legal policy, although several petitions were dismissed on standing or admissibility grounds. That trajectory changed fundamentally through Constitutional Court Decision No. 62/PUU-XXII/2024, delivered on 2 January 2025, which declared Article 222 unconstitutional and without binding legal force. Using normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, and case approaches, this study compares the Court’s earlier reasoning with the 2025 constitutional reversal and evaluates its implications for multiparty presidentialism. The analysis shows that presidential stability cannot be attributed to a nomination threshold alone. Coalition formation, party institutionalization, cabinet bargaining, and legislative incentives remain decisive. The Court’s new approach strengthens political equality and voter choice while leaving room for constitutional engineering that does not rely on seat or vote percentages. The article argues that post-threshold reform should focus on party institutionalization, transparent coalition rules, meaningful public participation, and stronger executive-legislative accountability rather than recreating the former threshold in another form.